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COMMENT
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: Void for Vagueness?
Professional groups have traditionally attempted to regulate their
members through codes of conduct. Such codes share the general pur-
poses of incorporating the highest ideals of the profession, of encourag-
ing members to strive toward the attainment of those ideals, and of
presenting to the public, which the professional group serves, the call-
ing's most favorable image. Some codes of conduct may go no further
than this, and thus are formulated in the broadest of terms, emphasiz-
ing public service, honesty, integrity, and other lofty traits as the guid-
ing lights of members' professional careers. Other organized
professions may seek to regulate their members' conduct in a more par-
ticularized fashion. Rather than merely exhorting colleagues to con-
duct themselves at all times as "honorable men," or some other equally
vague precept, and leaving it to each individual to work out the "hon-
orable" solution to each professional dilemma, these groups collec-
tively attempt to make the hard choices in advance, setting them out in
codes of conduct characterized by narrowly framed rules that all mem-
bers are expected to obey. To ensure professional conformity and obe-
dience, the rules must be backed by penalties, with exclusion from the
profession typically the ultimate disciplinary sanction.
The Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar As-
sociation, adopted in 1969, functions as a particularized rather than an
exhortative code of conduct. Though the ethical considerations of the
Code are framed as general principles of conduct and are said to be
only "aspirational" in character, the disciplinary rules (rules) are
"mandatory," and prescribe the minimum level of conduct with which
an attorney must comply in his relationships with clients, courts, and
colleagues.' Failure to comply with any disciplinary rule may result in
private or public reprimand, suspension, or disbarment of an attorney,
with the particular punishment left to the discretion of the state bars
and, ultimately, the courts.2 Having seemingly made the choice to gov-
ern itself by specifically prescribing certain conduct for certain circum-
stances, the ABA nevertheless adopted various disciplinary rules that
are written in such broad, general terms that they fail to prescribe any
I. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement.
2. See id.
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intelligible course of conduct.3 While such generally expressed profes-
sional goals, if they are so recognized, can serve a useful "aspirational"
function, when such goals must serve as rules of conduct whose viola-
tion invokes severe disciplinary sanctions, they can become a trap for
the unwary practitioner. If the legal profession were perfectly homoge-
neous, so that there was general agreement on the meaning of such
terms as "moral turpitude" or "fitness to practice law," there would be
no danger that some attorneys would be punished for conduct that they
did not recognize as unprofessional at the time they engaged in it. It
seems obvious, however, that no such consensus exists, for if it did
there would be no need for a formal code of conduct.
4
This Comment will discuss the problem of vagueness in the Code
in light of its perceived purpose and function as a code of professional
conduct. The void-for-vagueness doctrine, as developed by the United
States Supreme Court in passing on the constitutionality of statutes,
will supply the framework for analysis of the Code's disciplinary rules.
Though focusing on DR 1-102 and DR 7-107 as examples of some of
the problems created by vague regulatory language, discussion of the
rules will necessarily be in general terms. The conclusion is that,
though courts may be reluctant to interfere in the legal profession's
self-regulation to the extent of actually declaring its rules void for
vagueness, such a finding could be supported in terms of the vagueness
doctrine. The bar could be more protective of attorneys' rights, while
still regulating their conduct for the benefit of the public, by eliminat-
ing or clarifying the vaguely worded rules.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE IN
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has had such broad, and often
3. DR 1-102(A), which serves as a catchall for any type of misconduct not covered else-
where in the Code, is a prime example of an unintelligible rule of conduct. The rule in its entirety
provides:
DR 1-102 Misconduct.
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(I) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law.
4. See generally J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 40-73 (1976).
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unsystematic, application in the -United States Supreme Court that
even to refer to it as a "doctrine" may attribute to it more coherence
than it possesses. The leading authority on vagueness cases in the
United States Supreme Court has suggested that
the void-for-vagueness doctrine may be regarded less as a principle
regulating the permissible relationship between written law and the
potential offender than as a practical instrument mediating between
...all of the organs of public coercion of a state and ...the
institution of federal protection of the individual's private interests.
5
Though the application of the vagueness doctrine to invalidate a partic-
ular statute may frequently be inspired by practical concerns rather
than compelled by an objective analytical test, several general princi-
ples may nevertheless be derived from the doctrine's development and
use in the United States Supreme Court.
The vagueness doctrine encompasses two fundamental require-
ments of due process of law: that potential offenders receive adequate
notice of prohibited conduct, and that enforcement of the laws be as
uniform and nondiscriminatory as possible. Thus, in one of its earliest
decisions voiding a criminal statute for vagueness,6 the United States
Supreme Court pronounced: "[A] statute which either forbids or re-
quires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intel-
ligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law."7 Of later
development than the adequate notice requirement,8 the second princi-
ple of the vagueness doctrine guards against the uncontrolled discretion
allowed law enforcement personnel when a statute is so vague that it
fails to provide adequate guidelines for enforcement.9 Without the in-
dication of legislative intent supplied by a precisely worded statute, the
5. Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rev.
67, 81 (1960).
6. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
7. Id. at 391. The statute at issue in Connally was an Oklahoma law requiring that persons
employed by the state be paid not less than the "current rate ... in the locality" where the work
was to be performed. Id. at 388. The Supreme Court held that it contained a "double uncer-
tainty" in that "current rate of wages" did not denote a definite sum, and "locality" did not pre-
cisely define the area. Id. at 393-95.
8. For other decisions relying on the notice element in voiding a statute for vagueness, see
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927);
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
9. The most notable recent decision stressing this factor is Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), in which a vagrancy statute was voided for vagueness. The Supreme
Court found that the failure of the statute to provide standards to guide enforcement left "unfet-
tered discretion" in the hands of the police and provided a pretext for the arrest of any person
whose lifestyle they disapproved. Id. at 168.
1979]
NORTH CA4ROLINA LAW.REVIEW [Vol. 57
danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by police officers,
courts and juries may be considered great enough to offend due
process. 10
A third problem with vague laws arises when the law "abut[s]
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,"" and
thereby "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms."'" Be-
cause of the danger that a law regulating expression may infringe con-
stitutionally protected rights, higher standards of specificity are exacted
of such laws than of others that do not affect speech."' Thus, the basic
requirements of fair notice and adequate guidelines must be strictly ob-
served in this area.' 4 In addition, standing requirements tend to be
somewhat relaxed when regulations of expression are involved, and
one whose conduct falls clearly within that prohibited by an otherwise
vague statute may still raise the issue of vagueness when the first
amendment freedoms of others are endangered.'
5
The vagueness doctrine has not been limited to criminal statutes in
its application. Civil statutes, because they may provide a basis for the
deprivation of liberty or property, are also subject to due process stand-
ards, including that of clarity.'6 The "process" that is "due" in any
10. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (Massachusetts statute punishing
"[wihoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the
United States" void because its "standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections"); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937) (statute, mak-
ing "any attempt, by persuasion or otherwise, to induce others to join in any combined resistance
to the lawful authority of the state" constitute an attempt to incite insurrection, impermissibly
licenses jury to create own standard in each case).
1I. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
12. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
13. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573
(1974); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 611, 621-22 (1976) (ordinance requir-
ing that advance notice be given to local police by "[any person desiring to canvass, solicit or call
from house to house . . . for a recognized charitable cause . . . or . . . political campaign or
cause" held void for vagueness); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (statute authorizing
punishment by fine or imprisonment, or both, of anyone who "publicly mutilates, tramples upon,
defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the United States" invalidated as inherently vague);
Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968) (classification scheme for motion pictures
held unconstitutionally vague); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (statute prohibiting
printing and distribution of any publication principally made up of criminal news, police reports,
or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime, void on
its face).
15. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577-78 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
520-21 (1972). In the first amendment freedoms of expression area the vagueness problem is virtu-
ally indistinguishable from the related constitutional doctrine of overbreadth, under which laws
regulating expressive activity may be read to reach too far and prohibit expression protected by
the first amendment, and are therefore constitutionally defective. See Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadh Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 871-75 (1970).
16. In one of the earliest decisions employing the vagueness doctrine, A.B. Small Co. v.
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particular adjudication, however, depends upon the significance of the
interest at stake and the corresponding severity of the potential sanc-
tion.17 Expressed in terms of the vagueness doctrine, the degree of clar-
ity and specificity required of laws will increase as the potential
sanctions for their violation increase in severity. Because the loss of
personal liberty is generally considered to be more serious than a loss
of property, the requirements of sufficient notice and adequate guide-
lines will be stricter upon statutes enforced by criminal rather than civil
sanctions. The United States Supreme Court has recognized this prin-
ciple, t8 and, predictably, has invalidated far fewer civil than criminal
statutes on vagueness grounds.' 9 The inevitable imprecision of written
language must be tolerated to some extent, but highly valued interests
such as personal liberty or liberty of expression may be limited only in
the clearest possible terms.
Though it is virtually impossible to articulate a vagueness "test"
for different types of statutes in absolute terms, a "sliding scale" may be
visualized, upon which statutes regulating expression would be at the
top in terms of precision required, followed by those enforced by crimi-
nal sanctions. Civil statutes enforced only by a taking of property
would rest below criminal statutes on the scale. Property interests, how-
ever, may be of varying importance; the loss of a job or profession, for
example, will generally be a more serious deprivation than the payment
of a sum of money. Employment or professional regulations, therefore,
should rest below criminal statutes, but above ordinary civil statutes, in
the hierarchy of vagueness analysis. Because the Code fits within this
general class of regulations, it will be helpful to examine the body of
American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925), the Food Control Act, whose limitation to a rea-
sonable profit for necessaries had previously been held unconstitutionally vague as the basis for a
criminal prosecution in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), was also invali-
dated as a defense to a contract action for the price of sugar. Defendant's attempt to distinguish
Cohen aid other vagueness decisions as involving criminal penalties was rejected, the Supreme
Court asserting, "It was not the criminal penalty that was held invalid, but the exaction of obedi-
ence to a rule or standard which was so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at
all." 267 U.S. at 239. And in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382. U.S. 399 (1966), the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a state statute providing for the payment of court costs by an acquitted
misdemeanor defendant upon the recommendation of the jury because the statute was so vague
that it lacked any standards for its application. Whether labeled "penal" or "civil," the Court
held, the statute gave the state a procedure for depriving an acquitted defendant of liberty and
property, both of which were protected against state deprivation without due process standards.
Id. at 402.
17. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
18. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
19. See Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 69 n.16.
19791
NORTH CAROLINA L,4W REVIEW
law with respect to vagueness in such regulations in other contexts, in
order to place the Code accurately on the sliding scale.
II. APPLICATION OF VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE TO
EMPLOYMENT AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS
Because it is now generally recognized that public employees with
a legitimate expectation of continued employment have a "property"
and a "liberty" interest in their employment, and that such employ-
ment cannot be terminated by the state without the procedural safe-
guards required by due process of law,20 it follows that an employee
may not be dismissed or disciplined for infringement of an employ-
ment regulation that suffers from one or more of the defects of vague-
ness. In Baggett v. Bullit,2t for example, teachers were required to take
an oath that they would not engage in, or aid and abet, "subversive
activity," because a Washington statute provided that no "subversive
person" could be a state employee.22 The United States Supreme
Court held that the statute and the oath were unconstitutionally vague;
even construing the statute in its most favorable light, the Court ruled,
it could not be said that the oath provided an ascertainable standard of
conduct or did not require more than the state could command under
the first and fourteenth amendments.2 3 The Baggett decision, however,
is a rare instance of actual invalidation of an employee regulation on
vagueness grounds, and may be attributed to the fact that the oath
clearly infringed rights protected by the first amendment.24 In several
decisions since Baggelt, courts have been more lenient in their treat-
ment of vague language in employment regulations.25 Several factors
seem to contribute to this attitude. First, it is recognized that when the
conduct of a large and varied group of employees, such as civil ser-
vants, is sought to be regulated according to a common standard, it is
simply not practical for the government to spell out all prohibited con-
duct in detail.26 In Meehan v. Macy,27 for example, the United States
20. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972).
21. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
22. Id. at 362.
23. Id. at 372.
24. See notes 11-15 and accompanying text supra. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
25. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
26. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159 (1974); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 (1973); Waters v. Peterson, 495 F.2d 91, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
27. 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit commented,
"[E]ven the most conscientious of codes that define prohibited conduct
of employees includes 'catchall' clauses prohibiting employee 'miscon-
duct,' 'immorality' or 'conduct unbecoming.'"28 Second, generalities
in employment regulations are tolerated because they are not enforced
by criminal sanctions.29 The gravity of the punishment involved (for
example, reprimand, suspension or dismissal), however, may affect the
degree of specificity required in the regulation." Third, vague rules
may gain more definite content through "longstanding employment re-
lationships,"" previous warnings, 32 or a procedure by which an em-
ployee may get an authoritative ruling on the legality of a proposed
course of conduct.33 These corrective factors ensure that notice is pro-
vided and thus may lend validity to an otherwise vague regulation.
Similarly, courts have found regulation of certain closely knit, spe-
cialized groups suitable for special consideration. In Parker v. LeVy,
34
the unique character of military society and the "longstanding customs
and usages of the services" 35 were held to give meaning to the "seem-
ingly imprecise" standards of articles 133 and 134 of the Military Code
of Justice 6.3  Reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, which had held the two articles void for vagueness, 37 the
Supreme Court noted several factors that tended to narrow the articles'
broad language. First, all military personnel were instructed on the
28. Id. at 835.
29. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159 (1974); Waters v. Peterson, 495 F.2d 91,
100 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
30. See, e.g., Waters v. Peterson, 495 F.2d 91, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see Bence v. Breier,
501 F.2d 1185, 1189 n.2 (7th Cir. 1974).
31. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 160 (1974).
32. See, e.g., Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
33. See, e.g., Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
34. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
35. Id. at 746-47.
36. Article 133 of the Military Code, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1976), prohibits "conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman," while article 134, id. § 934, condemns "all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces." Defendant, a physician and
captain serving two years active duty, was convicted under both articles for making statements to
recruits that United States involvement in Viet Nam was wrong, that black soldiers had no reason
to go, and that the Special Forces were liars, thieves, and killers of peasants, women and children.
He was sentenced to dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and three
years hard labor. 417 U.S. at 738.
37. 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). See also Avrech v. Secretary of
the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 676 (1974) (also holding the two articles
of the Military Code void for vagueness). Avrech was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court on the authority of its Parker decision.
1979]
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contents of the Military Code, and a complete text would be made
available on request to anyone on active duty.38 Second, the United
States Court of Military Appeals had construed both articles, supplying
specific examples of the conduct covered, and partially narrowing their
broad scope.39 Though it recognized that vague areas remained in the
articles' language despite these narrowing constructions, the Court held
that the needed definiteness could be supplied by "less formalized cus-
tom and usage" of traditional military society.40 Because of the special
nature of the military, the Court further concluded that the proper
standard of review for a vagueness challenge to the Military Code of
Justice was the standard applied to criminal statutes regulating eco-
nomic affairs, rather than that traditionally applied to statutes regulat-
ing first amendment freedoms of expression in civilian life.4 ' Because
defendant should clearly have been on notice that his particular con-
duct was within the range of that prohibited by articles 133 and 134, the
Parker Court reasoned, the articles could not be deemed vague as ap-
plied to him; furthermore, because the distinctive character of the mili-
tary community required a different application of first amendment
doctrines, defendant lacked standing to challenge the facial validity of
the articles.42
It is uncertain whether this watered-down vagueness analysis, tai-
lored to the military context, might also be applied to regulations gov-
erning other professional groups that are less specialized than the
military, but more cohesive than government civil servants. A police
department regulation virtually identical to the Military Code's articles
133 and 134 was held unconstitutionally vague by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Bence v. Breier,43 but the
United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the question. The Bence
38. 417 U.S. at 751-52.
39. Id. at 752.
40. Id. at 754.
41. Id. at 756. It is apparently the overriding need for obedience and discipline in the mili-
tary that justifies the reduced protection of constitutional rights among the armed forces. Id. at
758-59.
42. Though relying primarily on the military context of the regulation, the Parker Court also
noted its reluctance in other contexts to strike down a statute on its face when there was a broad
range of conduct to which it could be constitutionally applied. Id. at 757-61.
43. 501 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1121 (1975). Policemen Bence and
Hanneman were reprimanded under rule 44, section 8 of the department's rules and regulations,
which authorized dismissal or other punishment for "[clonduct unbecoming a member and detri-
mental to the service." Their offense consisted of sending a letter to the city's chief labor negotia-




court contrasted these departmental rules with the employee regula-
tions in Waters v. Peterson' and Arnett v. Kennedy,45 which were
found not capable of being made more specific because they were in-
tended to govern "myriad ...federal employees performing widely
disparate tasks."46 The police regulations, in contrast, were formulated
"to apply to an essentially homogeneous group of employees perform-
ing essentially similar job functions,"'47 and could thus be more pre-
cisely worded. Indeed, as the court of appeals noted, "the Chief of
Police was able to specifically identify thirty other grounds for termina-
tion or punishment, each of which would presumably also be unbecom-
ing conduct."4 8 On the other hand, the court reasoned that a police
department was not sufficiently specialized and differentiated from the
rest of society to justify the lenient standard of specificity held applica-
ble in the military context in Parker; nor was there a similar history
and tradition to give the same content to the words "conduct unbecom-
ing" that the Parker Court had gleaned from military tradition and
precedent.49 Concluding that the separate nature of military society
had been the decisive factor in Parker, the Bence court distinguished
Parker on that basis and, applying the traditionally strict test of vague-
ness in the area of rules affecting first amendment freedoms, invali-
dated the police department regulation.50
In summary, though employment or professional regulations gen-
erally should rest below criminal statutes, but above ordinary civil stat-
utes, in the hierarchy of vagueness analysis, the specificity required of
them will also be affected by whether they curtail freedom of speech,
whether they are enforced by reprimand or dismissal, and the breadth
of the range of conduct that they must regulate. Additionally, the regu-
lations of certain specialized professions may warrant different consid-
eration because their members have taken on special responsibilities
requiring curtailment of their liberty and because their differentiation
from society and particular traditions lend a specificity to their rules
44. 495 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
46. Id. at 159; see text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
47. 501 F.2d at 1190.
48. Id. at 1189.
49. Id. at 1191-92.
50. Id. at 1190-91. See also Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 903 (1978) (police regulations limiting discussion and criticism of superiors or other
members held void on overbreadth grounds). But see Kannisto v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 541 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (police regulation prohibiting
"unofficerlike conduct" which "tends to subvert the good order, efficiency or discipline of the
Department" not vague as applied to this petitioner).
1979]
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that would not otherwise exist. While the Military Code of Justice has
been placed within this category, police regulations generally have not.
With these generalizations in mind, a consideration of the proper posi-
tion of the lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility in the hierar-
chy of the vagueness doctrine can be undertaken.
III. APPLICATION OF VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE TO THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
With the recognition that public employees have a protectible
property interest in their jobs, an attorney's license to practice may also
be viewed as a type of "new property" of which she cannot be divested
without due process of law." The Code of Professional Responsibility,
because it governs an attorney's practice and can be the basis for sus-
pension or removal of her license, must therefore be sufficiently specific
in its terms to satisfy the due process requirements expressed in the
vagueness doctrine. Additionally, because the sanctions authorized by
the Code may be severe and stigmatizing, they may have the effect of
depriving an attorney of her liberty to practice the profession she has
chosen and qualified for. 2 In order to evaluate the strength of these
property and liberty interests and the extent of their potential depriva-
tion under the Code, and thereby to determine the degree of specificity
that should be required of the rules, further consideration must be
given to the nature of attorney disciplinary proceedings, the possible
sanctions imposed for violations of the rules, and the character of the
legal profession itself.
State courts had generally assumed disciplinary proceedings to be
civil actions53 until two United States Supreme Court cases in the late
1960's forced a recognition that in at least some respects they are in the
nature of criminal proceedings. 4 In Spevack v. Klein,5 the Supreme
51. See Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1976); In
re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355 (7th Cir. 1972). See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964).
52. The Supreme Court has never precisely defined "liberty," but it has frequently stated that
the term encompasses more than mere freedom from physical restraint. See, e.g., Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). More re-
cently, the Court indicated that a person's liberty is infringed when charges are made against him
that "might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community," or endanger his
"good name, reputation, honor, or integrity." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-74
(1972).
53. See, e.g., Sheiner v. Florida, 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955); In re Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26
N.E.2d 963 (1940); In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782, cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1917).
54. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
55. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
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Court overruled an earlier decision 56 and held that the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination is available to lawyers in dis-
barment proceedings. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
reaffirmed the holding of Malloy v. Hogan57 that the self-incrimination
clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
and added that "it extends its protection to lawyers as well as other
individuals, and. . . it should not be watered down by imposing the
dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price
for asserting it."'58 Referring to the language in Malloy that the state
may not impose a penalty 59 for invocation of the privilege, Justice
Douglas further stated that "penalty" did not refer only to fine or im-
prisonment, but to "any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege 'costly.' 60 The threat of disbarment, with the
consequent loss of professional standing and livelihood was not only
costly, the Spevak Court concluded, but represented as powerful a form
of compulsion as the use of the legal process against one accused of a
61crime.
Though the Supreme Court never explicitly stated in Spevack that
disbarment was a criminal penalty, given the language of the fifth
amendment62 and the Court's broad definition of "penalty," the con-
clusion seemed inescapable. The next year, in considering another dis-
barment appeal in In re Ruffalo,63 the Court hardly resolved the
uncertainty when it dubbed disbarment trials "adversary proceedings
of a quasi-criminal nature."'  Attorney Ruffalo had been brought
before the Ohio State Bar Association's Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline on charges of soliciting clients in Federal
Employers' Liability Act cases. He testified that he had hired an em-
ployee of the railroad company not to solicit clients among its employ-
ees, but only to investigate cases for him.65 The Board subsequently
added the hiring of one of the railroad's employees to investigate the
56. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
57. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
58. 385 U.S. at 514.
59. 378 U.S. at 8.
60. 385 U.S. at 515.
61. Id. at 516.
62. "No person .. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self. ... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
63. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
64. Id. at 551.
65. Id. at 546.
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company as a charge against Ruffalo, and he was disbarred for that
offense; the only evidence offered in the proceeding was the testimony
of Ruffalo and of the investigator.66 The Court reversed Ruffalo's fed-
eral disbarment on the ground that he had been denied procedural due
process in that he had had no notice of the precise nature of the charges
before the proceedings began.67 In holding the attorney entitled to pro-
cedural due process, the Ruffalo Court noted, "[D]isbarment, designed
to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the law-
yer."68 Thus, though the Court never defined the term "quasi-crimi-
nal,"69 it clearly indicated that it considered the gravity of the
disbarment sanction sufficient to warrant substantial due process pro-
tection in any proceeding in which this sanction might be invoked.
State and lower federal courts have generally resisted the notion
that disciplinary proceedings are actually criminal in nature.7" This is
a predictable reaction since to conclude otherwise would require
significant changes in those proceedings, such as the assumption of a
greater burden of proof by the state.7 Though recognizing that the
potentially drastic consequences to an attorney require that disciplinary
proceedings fully comply with due process, 72 courts also point to the
special function of such proceedings as inquiries into the fitness of of-
ficers of the court to continue to serve in a position of public trust.
73
66. Id. at 546-47. Ruffalo was disbarred from the federal district court in Ohio following his
state disbarment. Only the federal disbarment was before the Court on this appeal.
67. Id. at 552.
68. Id. at 550 (citing Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,515 (1967); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333, 380 (1866)).
69. The Auffalo Court cited In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), as support for its use of the term
"quasi-criminal." 390 U.S. at 551. Gaultheld that juvenile cases, though they had been tradition-
ally labeled civil rather than criminal proceedings, must be vested with many of the procedural
safeguards required in adult criminal trials, because the possible sanctions in juvenile court could
be as severe as those in criminal court. 387 U.S. at 30, 49-50. In later decisions the Supreme
Court held that the standard of proof required for juveniles accused of a crime is "beyond a
reasonable doubt," In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970), but also that there is no constitutional
right to a jury trial in juvenile court, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
70. See, e.g., In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1353 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349
(7th Cir. 1970); Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), a'd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976); Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 676,
687, 499 P.2d 968, 974, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288, 294 (1972); In re Schwarz, 51 Ill. 2d 334, 282 N.E.2d
689, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972); Howell v. State, 559 S.W.2d 432, 435-36 (Tex. Ct. App.
1977).
71. The present standard of proof in disciplinary cases is "by a preponderance of the evi-
dence." Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 906-07 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Committee on Legal Ethics v.
Graziani, 200 S.E.2d 353, 355 (W. Va. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).
72. See, e.g., In re Bithoney, 487 F.2d 319, 323 (Ist Cir. 1973); Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d
1205, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972); Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 425
U.S. 901 (1976).
73. See, e.g., In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1970); Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp.
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The implication is that the public must be protected from unethical
lawyers, and that this effort will be thwarted if erring attorneys must be
afforded the full panoply of criminal due process. One answer to this
argument is that the public in general will also receive the benefit of
procedures tending to protect all members of the bar from removal
without just cause; another, of course, is that the choice was made in
the Constitution to afford the individual faced with severe penalties fair
treatment even though such treatment involves a risk to society that a
guilty person may go unpenalized.
Assuming for the moment that the vagueness standard for criminal
statutes marks the upper limit of the Code's position on the scale, one
may first consider the minimum level of specificity that the Code should
be required to meet. Employment regulations in general, as concluded
above, would be placed below criminal statutes but above other civil
statutes in the hierarchy of vagueness analysis. The lawyers' Code,
however, should arguably receive stricter scrutiny for vagueness than
the regulations of other groups such as public employees. Attorneys
must spend considerable time and money in order to become qualified
for a license to practice law. The loss of that license74 is usually, there-
fore, a greater deprivation of property than that suffered by a public
employee who is dismissed from a job. The public employee, more-
over, may often be able to find new employment that requires the same
or similar skills, whereas the disbarred attorney is forbidden to use,
anywhere in the state, the very skills he spent such time and energy
acquiring. The former has lost a job, while the latter has been deprived
of his profession.75 Furthermore, disbarment, or even the lesser sanc-
tions of suspension and reprimand, is by its nature a public penalty,
marking the lawyer who suffers it a betrayer of public trust. The loss of
reputation and public opprobrium attached to the punishment of attor-
neys for ethical violations thus infringe their liberty and bring these
182, 191-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); State v. Turner, 217 Kan. 574, 579, 538 P.2d 966, 973-74 (1975) (per
curiam).
74. Disbarment is, of course, the stiffest of several possible penalties against an attorney once
disciplinary action is begun by a state bar. Violations of the disciplinary rules may also result in
suspension of an attorney's license to practice law for a specified period of time, or in issuance of a
public or private reprimand or a letter of caution. Though the actual penalty imposed on an
attorney would be a factor in a claim by that individual that the rule he was accused of violating
was unconstitutionally vague, a vagueness standard for the Code must reflect that disbarment is a
possible punishment for violation of any disciplinary rule.
75. Deprivation of a profession has been recognized to be a more serious property loss than
that of a job. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972); Cafeteria Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96 (1961).
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sanctions closer to the character of criminal penalties than are the
range of sanctions normally invoked against public employees.
The foregoing analysis suggests that in terms of vagueness the
Code should be closer to the top of the scale, approaching the specific-
ity required of criminal statutes, than are other employment regula-
tions. Rather than attempting to define the appropriate vagueness test
by debating whether disciplinary proceedings should be labeled civil or
criminal, it will be helpful to consider the substantive content of the
term "quasi-criminal," used by the Supreme Court to characterize such
proceedings. Given that the Court did not go so far as to conclude that
all the due process safeguards of criminal trials should be transplanted
to disciplinary proceedings, a reasonable interpretation of the term
"quasi-criminal" in this context is that because the possible sanction
against the individual attorney is grave, some of the procedural safe-
guards required in ordinary criminal trials will be carried over to disci-
plinary proceedings, unless the protection thereby gained for the
individual is not significant enough to offset the resulting social and
administrative costs. In terms of the vagueness test, the disciplinary
rules of the Code should be required to meet the same strict standard of
specificity as are criminal statutes if the added protection for the attor-
ney and the accompanying benefit to the public outweigh the social
cost resulting from the imposition of the strict standard.
Obviously, the clearly defined boundary between ethical and un-
ethical conduct that would be required under a strict test for vagueness
would be of great benefit to attorneys. Because most states hold that it
is incumbent on every attorney to know the disciplinary rules,7 6 and the
punishment for imperfect knowledge is severe, an attorney needs to
have clear notice of what conduct is forbidden. And to the extent that
receiving clear notice of what conduct is deemed unethical will discour-
age attorneys from engaging in that conduct, the public will likewise
receive a benefit from precise rules. On the other hand, requiring the
Code to be precisely worded would not add the administrative costs
that would be occasioned by the addition of other components of crimi-
nal proceedings, such as jury trials and the requirement of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt, to disciplinary proceedings.
Furthermore, vaguely worded rules may invite state bar associa-
tions, or factions thereof, to weed out attorneys who are unorthodox or
politically unpopular by current standards. This has happened in the
76. See, e.g., State v. Alvey, 215 Kan. 460, 524 P.2d 747 (1974).
684 [Vol. 57
V7 G UENESS
past, during periods of political dissension and backlash in the bar, and
vague requirements such as proof of "good moral character" or lack of
"moral turpitude" have provided the vehicle.77 The presence of
standardless rules such as DR 1-10278 leaves open the possibility that it
could occur again.
Arbitrary enforcement can be expected if, for example, there is no
consensus on what types of conduct are included in the phrase "preju-
dicial to the administration of justice." The lack of consensus on the
meaning of this phrase is illustrated in Howell v. State,79 in which an
attorney, during a hearing on a previous citation for contempt, became
a witness for himself on his motion for a continuance. He testified that
he had asked four different attorneys to represent him on the charge,
but each had refused because of the fear of possible prejudice in future
appearances before the judge involved. When ordered to name the
four attorneys, Howell refused, and his refusal became the basis for a
charge of violating DR 1-102(A)(5), for which he was tried before a
jury." The jury found that Howell had refused to answer the question
from the court, but also found that this refusal did not constitute con-
duct prejudicial to the administration of justice.8' The judge, however,
set aside the jury's second finding and held that the issue was a ques-
tion for the court; 2 finding Howell guilty, the court ordered him pub-
licly reprimanded. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed.
8 3
This disagreement on the meaning of "prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice" might have occurred because the jury were laymen
and failed to appreciate the legal meaning of the term. The court, how-
ever, rejected a vagueness challenge to the rule by referring to its com-
mon everyday meaning."4 Of course, there is no indication that the use
of DR 1-102 in Howell was motivated by personal or political reasons,
77. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1957); Hallinan v. Committee of Bar
Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966); Comment, Controlling Lawyers
by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 301, 312-14 (1970); Comment, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bar Discpinary Proceedings: Whatever Happened to
Sfpevack, 23 VILL. L.J. 127, 135-36 (1977).
78. Quoted in note 3 supra.
79. 559 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
80. Id. at 433-34. Howell was also cited for contempt for his refusal to answer. The miscon-
duct charge by the bar seems excessive because he was acting as a witness at the time, and because
the information sought by the court was not really relevant to the merits of his case or essential for
purposes of his motion for a continuance.
81. Id. at 434.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 438.
84. Id. at 435-36.
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but it illustrates the ease with which the rule could be employed when
such motivations exist.85
In one sense, however, a Code consisting only of narrowly drawn
rules might be considered contrary to the public interest. When pro-
hibited conduct is narrowly defined, there is a greater likelihood that
some types of conduct generally thought to be undesirable when en-
gaged in by attorneys will not be covered by the proscription, either
because such conduct was not foreseen by the drafters, or because it is
very close to the forbidden zone, but not within it. Thus, it could be
argued that like the regulations governing the conduct of civil ser-
vants,86 the disciplinary rules cannot feasibly be made specific because
they must govern too broad a range of conduct or too disparate a
group.
Yet attorneys as a professional group would probably be consid-
ered more homogeneous than the civil servants in Arnett v. Zenned,
87
and Waters v. Peterson,88 in which broadly worded regulations were
upheld.89 Additionally, the civil service regulations sought to set out a
common standard of job protection for employees performing a variety
of tasks,90 while the Code's disciplinary rules are intended to define
prohibited conduct and are backed by penal sanctions.9' Thus, though
it would not be an easy task for the bar to draft a Code consisting only
of precisely drawn rules, it does not appear that the task is made impos-
sible by the nature of the legal profession. And in view of the serious
penal sanctions backing the present rules, the bar can reasonably be
expected to make the extra effort needed to achieve clarity. As the
court noted of the police regulations in Bence, that the bar was able to
formulate forty other, more specific grounds for reprimand or disbar-
ment in the Code, each of which would also presumably constitute
85. Arbitrary use of DR 1-102 is facilitated by the practice of allowing bar associations to try
an attorney on various factual charges of misconduct, and name the various disciplinary rules
violated only upon pronouncement of a guilty verdict. See, e.g., Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); State v. Alvey, 215 Kan. 460, 524 P.2d 747 (1974).
86. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
87. 416 U.S. 134 (1973).
88. 495 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
89. Although attorneys do engage in widely varying forms of practice and frequently work in
nonlegal areas, they all must attain a law degree and their work will generally involve legal
problems. A civil servant, on the other hand, may be anyone from the lowest-level clerk to the
highest bureaucrat, and the tasks involved range from typing to complex scientific analysis.
90. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 159.
91. See notes 54-69 and accompanying text supra. In justifying their decisions, the courts in
both Arnett and Waters, in contrast, noted that the civil service regulations were not intended to
define criminal conduct. See 416 U.S. at 159; 495 F.2d at 99.
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"conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice," indicates that the
regulation of the legal profession could be effected through more pre-
cise language than that employed in DR 1-102.92
Furthermore, the mere possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement has been an important factor in Supreme Court decisions
voiding criminal statutes for vagueness,93 indicating that the Court con-
siders that danger important enough to outweigh the countervailing
risk that precise statutes will not cover all undesirable conduct. Thus
one may conclude that the disciplinary rules, in view of the purpose
they are intended to serve, could fairly be held to the exacting standard
of specificity required of criminal statutes, and that applying such a
standard should not, on the whole, be contrary to the public interest.
One final consideration in this discussion of the degree of specific-
ity to be required of the Code must be whether the legal profession is
sufficiently cohesive and differentiated from society by its own history
and traditions to give content to seemingly imprecise professional rules
and to justify the application of a more lenient standard of vagueness
to those rules, along the lines of that applied to the Military Code in
Parker v. Levy. This rationale has been adopted by some courts, 94 but
for several reasons it appears misplaced. Though new lawyers have
generally received instruction on the ABA Code in law school in the
same manner that new recruits in the military have been versed on the
Military Code, it is less likely in the legal context than in the military
context that the interpretations of those respective codes will be uni-
form. Moreover, the myriad interpretations of the ABA Code by vari-
ous state and federal courts cannot carry the same authority as the
years of narrowing construction of the Code of Military Justice by the
92. For examples of the use of DR 1-102 to cover a variety of sins, see State v. Martindale,
215 Kan. 667, 527 P.2d 703 (1974) (per curiam), in which an attorney was indefinitely suspended
by the state bar for violations of DR -102(A)(5) and DR 7-109(B) (prohibiting the secretion of
witnesses). The Kansas Supreme Court found that attorney Martindale's actions (he met the
state's witnesses by chance outside the courtroom and, not knowing they were under subpoena,
advised them that they did not have to testify; he then neglected to inform the court that they had
been there) did not amount to a violation of DR 7-109(B), but was conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice under DR 1-102(A)(5), because the attorney's silence misled the court.
The court reduced the indefinite suspension to a public censure. 1d. at 673, 527 P.2d at 707. And in
State Bar v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974), the Texas Bar found an attorney had
violated DR 1-102(A)(5) by criticizing a judge, on the basis of his qualifications, in a letter to a
newspaper. The bar ordered a formal reprimand; the state court reversed it on appeal and found
no violation of the Code. Id. at 434.
93. See notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
94. See, e.g., In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324 (1st Cir. 1973); In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119, 126
(D.C. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 640, 504 P.2d 211, 214 (1972) (per curiam).
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United States Court of Military Appeals. Although the word "prejudi-
cial" in the phrase "conduct prejudicial"-the legal counterpart of the
military's "conduct unbecoming"-may be found in frequent use
throughout the legal system, this is hardly proof for the proposition that
all attorneys would agree on the parameters of the conduct it defines,
though they might well agree that certain types of conduct would fall
within it.
95
Aside from such core areas of agreement, however, the legal pro-
fession is simply not as homogeneous, traditional and specialized in
function as the military, whose unique character and customs were
found to give a uniform content to the Military Code. Justice White
has said that an attorney should not be disbarred under an unspecific
standard if responsible attorneys would differ in appraising the propri-
ety of the conduct cited.9 6 Because responsible attorneys will inevitably
differ over the meaning of "prejudice," "fitness" and "moral turpi-
tude," and the conduct they define, the traditions of the legal profession
are not adequate to fill in the gaps in those vague standards.97
Moreover, the Military Code provision was upheld under a diluted
standard of vagueness review because the special responsibilities of ser-
vicemen in defense of the country, and the overriding need for disci-
pline and obedience in the armed forces justify more limited
constitutional rights for servicemen than for civilians. 98 Though law-
yers also have special responsibilities to the public as officers of the
court, those responsibilities are not thought sufficient to warrant a simi-
lar restriction of their rights; the Supreme Court has on several occa-
sions affirmed that lawyers must be guaranteed the same constitutional
rights as laymen. 99
Thus there appears to be no compelling reason why the lawyers'
Code should not be required to meet the same exacting standard of
specificity as that required of criminal statutes. Because the scrutiny of
statutory language must of necessity be tailored to the purpose and
function of the particular statute under review, however, it appears to
95. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 463 Pa. 472, 482, 345 A.2d 616, 621-
22 (1975) (DR 1-102)(A)(5) and (6) are "arguably vague," but clearly applied to petitioner's con-
duct, which included fraudulent receipt of money for supposed illegal destruction of evidence).
96. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 555-56 (white, J., concurring).
97. On the growing stratification and lack of homogeneity in the legal profession in the twen-
tieth century, see J. AUERBACH, supra note 4, at 40-73.
98. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 758-59.




be impossible to define that standard in absolute terms (at least, the
Supreme Court has not done so). But in practical terms, application of
this standard means that if a statute or rule contains key words that are
incapable of precise definition, this flaw will not be excused on grounds
such as the mildness of its sanctions or the particular defendant's
knowledge that his conduct came within the prohibition. Under such a
standard, several of the disciplinary rules, notably DR 1-102, should be
found unconstitutionally vague. °° Furthermore, some of the rules
clearly affect first amendment rights of lawyers, and thus should be
subjected to the strictest standard of vagueness analysis. 01 Some of the
provisions of DR 7-107, concerning trial publicity, provide a good ex-
ample of the vagueness problems in this area of the Code, because they
directly control speech and have been a frequent source of litigation.
In the area of trial publicity, the first amendment rights of attor-
neys to comment on cases presently in litigation may conflict with the
sixth amendment right of an accused to a fair trial before an impartial
tribunal. Attorneys and courts generally agree that when this confron-
tation occurs, the attorney's right to speak must give way, to the extent
necessary to protect the right to a fair trial.10 2 Rules restricting speech,
however, must be drawn as narrowly as possible in order to avoid
greater constraints on speech than the necessary minimum.
0 3
DR 7-107(D), (G) and (H) limit an attorney's extra-judicial re-
marks during the trial of a criminal, civil, or administrative matter by
forbidding, at the minimum, comment on any matter "reasonably
likely to interfere with a fair trial" of the action; DR 7-107(E) employs
the same standard to limit comments prior to the imposition of sen-
tence in a criminal proceeding."° The United States Court of Appeals
100. DR 1-102 presents the most obvious vagueness problem of all the rules because it appears
intended to function as a catchall for any offenses not covered by the other rules. DR 7-107 will be
discussed as the best example of vagueness in a rule affecting sensitive first amendment rights.
Some of the more specific rules, however, also contain key words without precise meaning, mak-
ing it difficult to determine exactly when the line between lawful and prohibited conduct is
crossed. Examples of such rules include DR 5-105(A) ("A lawyer shall decline proffered employ-
ment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is
likely to be adversel, affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment. ... ); DR 6-
101(A)(3) ("A lawyer shall not: . . . Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him"); DR 9-101(B) ("A
lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility
while he was a public employee.") (emphasis added).
101. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
102. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1143 (E.D. Va.
1976), ajf'd inpart, rev'dinpart sub nom. Hirschkop v. Snead, No. 76-2016 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 1979).
103. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974).
104. DR 7-107, Trial Publicity, provides in pertinent part:
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for the Seventh Circuit held, in Chicago Council ofLawyers v. Bauer,"°5
that this standard made the rule unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad; the next year, a federal district court upheld the same rule
against a vagueness challenge.'0 6 The Bauer court considered that, to
pass constitutional muster, the rules must each incorporate the stan-
dard of "serious and imminent threat" of interference with a fair trial
or the fair administration of justice as the threshold of prohibited
speech. 0 7 This narrower formulation would put the lawyer on stricter
notice of what was forbidden, and would eliminate the overbreadth
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer or law firm
associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not make or
participate in making an extra-judicial statement !hat a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to
the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to
interfere with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or refer without comment
to public records of the court in the case.
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal matter and
prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm associated with the prose-
cution or defense shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial state-
ment that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by public
communication and that is reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence.
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its investigation
or litigation make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement, other than
a quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to:
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action.
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law firm associ-
ated therewith shall not make or participate in making a statement, other than a
quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would ex-
pect to be disseminated by means of public communication if it is made outside the
official course of the proceeding and relates to:
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing.
105. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). See generally Note, Profes-
sional Responsibility-Trial Publicity--Speech Restrictions Must Be Narrowly Drawn, 54 TEx. L.
REv. 1158 (1976).
106. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1976), aj'd in part, rev'din
part sub non. Hirschkop v. Snead, No. 76-2016 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 1979). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the specific limitations on statements by lawyers made
prior to trial or disposition without trial of a criminal matter found in DR 7-107(B) and (C) with
the "reasonable likelihood of interference with a fair trial" standard as an implied qualifier.
Hirschkop v. Snead, No. 76-2016, slip op. at 9-27 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 1979), afg in part, re;,g inpart
Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1976). The court further held,
however, that the restrictions on speech during bench trials, sentencing proceedings. disciplinary
and juvenile proceedings, and civil trials were overbroad, and it concluded that the catchall pro-
scription on statements about "other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair
trial" in DR 7-107(D)-(H) was unconstitutionally vague. Slip op. at 33-37.
107. 522 F.2d at 249-50. See also Markfield v. Association of the Bar, 49 App. Div. 2d 516, 370
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1975) (incorporating "clear and present danger" standard into provisions of DR 7-
107).
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problem, though the rule would still suffer from vagueness without spe-
cific rules as examples of speech that would presumptively pose a "seri-
ous and imminent threat" to a fair trial or (in the pretrial stages
covered in DR 7-107(A), (B) and (C)) the fair administration of jus-
tice."°8 Additionally, the Bauer court held that some of the specific
provisions of DR 7-107 must be articulated more narrowly than at
present. 0 9
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia concluded in Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, ° that the
"reasonably likely" standard offered the least drastic, effective method
of protecting an accused's right to a fair trial against prejudicial public-
ity." The standard provided adequate notice, the court reasoned,
when considered in the context of its applicability only to trial lawyers,
who should know what statements would be reasonably likely to inter-
fere with a fair trial." 2 Accepting defendant's assurance that the spe-
cific restrictions in DR 7-107(A), (B), (G) and (H) were to be read as
incorporating the "reasonably likely" standard, the district court held
that the rules were constitutional.! '3
The Bauer court's reasoning with regard to the language of DR 7-
107 appears to reflect more accurately the concerns expressed in the
doctrine of vagueness than that of the Hirschkop court. The Bauer
court applied an exacting standard of specificity to the rule, which is
appropriate in light of its encroachment on first amendment rights and
the serious sanctions for its violation. The Hirschkop court, on the
other hand, evaluated the rule in terms of the standard in Civil Service
Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers,"4 in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld civil service regulations that were
"set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common
sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to
the public interest.""' This standard, however, is less exacting than
108. 522 F.2d at 250.
109. The court invalidated any presumption of a serious and imminent threat arising from a
defense attorney's extra-judicial statements during the investigative stages of a criminal trial, id. at
253, held that the catchall "or other matters" language of 7-107(D) must be eliminated, id. at 256,
and, finally, rejected any presumption of a serious and imminent threat arising from extra-judicial
statements made during a civil proceeding, id. at 258.
110. 421 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1976), aq'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Hirschkop v.
Snead, No. 76-2016 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 1979). For a statement of the court of appeals' holding, see
note 106 supra.
111. Id. at 1145-46.
112. Id. at 1148.
113. Id. at 1155.
114. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
115. Id. at 579, quoted with approvalin Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. at 1148.
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that which should be applied to rules that may be the basis for "quasi-
criminal" disciplinary action against a lawyer.' 16
The Hirschkop court further relied on a presumption that the rule
would apply only to experienced trial lawyers. In one of the more co-
gent statements of the idea that legal history and traditions supply the
content for otherwise vague rules, the court opined: "The use and
meaning of the word 'reasonable' is as familiar to a lawyer as is the
meaning of the word 'faith' to a priest. Both are difficult to define but a
lawyer knows what reasonable means just as a priest knows what faith
means." " 7 Since even a priest could hardly deny that "faith" means
something different to each individual, this is actually a compelling
statement of the case for replacing "reasonable" as the key word mark-
ing the boundary between permissible and punishable speech.
Not only does the present formulation fail to give adequate notice
of forbidden conduct, because reasonable attorneys would disagree
about what statements would be reasonably likely to interfere with a
fair trial, but its vague terms invite arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement against controversial attorneys in this sensitive area. In fact,
a pretrial settlement in the Hirschkop case itself included an acknowl-
edgement by the Virginia State Bar that the grounds of the past charges
against Hirschkop under DR 7-107 did not actually constitute viola-
tions, but appeared to have arisen in cases in which the complainants
disagreed with the causes supported and espoused by the accused attor-
ney. " 8 Finally, the Bauer court properly considered the public interest
to be a factor in its decision. It emphasized the public's right to know,
and pointed to the usefulness of attorneys as informed, credible sources
of information on pending litigation and as potential checks on govern-
ment abuses." 19 As long as the accused's right to a fair trial receives full
protection, which it would under a "serious and imminent threat" stan-
dard, it is in the public's interest to receive as much information as
possible, from all sources, about the operation of the judicial system.
Thus the public interest factor, in addition to the other considerations
that should affect the analysis of vagueness in the Code, indicate that
DR 7-107 should be subjected to the most exacting standard of specific-
ity, and under that standard should be found unconstitutionally vague.
116. See notes 56-71 and accompanying text supra.
117. 421 F. Supp. at 1148.
118. Id. at 1140. As a result, the charges had been dropped, and on this acknowledgment, all
parties defendant in the present suit were dropped except the Supreme Court of Virginia. The
court then took jurisdiction of the declaratory judgment action alone.
119. 522 F.2d at 250.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, which is designed
to regulate the legal profession by delineating approved and forbidden
conduct, frequently does so in inappropriately broad terms. As a re-
sult, there is a significant possibility that attorneys may be disbarred or
otherwise disciplined for actions they did not perceive to be unethical
or violative of a disciplinary rule. The lack of precision in the rules
also allows selective enforcement of their provisions if state bar com-
mittees are so inclined, and may result in curtailment of attorneys' first
amendment rights to a greater extent than the necessary minimum.
When these dangers are placed alongside the severity of possible sanc-
tions for violations of the rules, the need for greater clarity is apparent.
Though the public may require protection from unethical lawyers, this
goal can be accomplished as effectively with precise rules as with vague
ones. Thus, the fundamental policies of the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine as it has developed in the United States Supreme Court lead to
the conclusion that some of the disciplinary rules of the Code should be
declared unconstitutionally vague. The federal courts, however, are
traditionally reluctant to interfere in this sphere, which is considered to
be the prerogative of the states to control. Court decisions actually
voiding the rules for vagueness are therefore unlikely unless wholesale
violations of attorneys' constitutional rights begin to occur. The ABA
should not wait for that unlikely eventuality, however, but should itself
confront the problem by eliminating unnecessary vagueness from the
Code.
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